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ANIMAL BEHAVIOR EVIDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence as to the actions of animals occupies a small niche in the
field of criminal evidence. Within the area of animal behavior evidence
the major preoccupation has been with problems relating to tracking
dogs, particularly bloodhound testimony.' The Montana Supreme Court,
however, has not only been confronted with bloodhound testimony, but,
with far more frequency, testimony of bovine behavior in cattle rustling
cases. The problem posed by these cases has been whether testimony as to
animal behavior is admissible as competent evidence, or inadmissible as
hearsay. The following investigation sets forth the contradictory positions
taken by the Montana Court. While allowing evidence of cattle behavior,
the Court balked at admitting bloodhound testimony. Possible reasons
for this divergence, such as a distinction between instinctive and learned
behavior or distinctions between the species of animals involved, have
been suggested in order to attempt a determination of the present
status of animal behavior evidence in Montana and what effect it may
have on the increasing use of canine detection by police.
II. THE QUANDRY
The Montana rule on the admissibility of cattle behavior evidence
stems from State v. Foley2 where the defendant was convicted of
s t e a 1 i n g four calves. Over objections, three witnesses, experienced
cattlemen, testified that they saw four of the complainant's cows near a
corral on the defendant's ranch containing nine calves. They turned
the calves out to the cows and four calves began nursing. These were
the same cows seen running with calves in a location twelve miles
from where defendant claimed to have found them. The complainant,
over objection, testified that when sucking calves are separated from
their mothers and corralled, the cows will stay within the corral area.
According to the Montana Supreme Court, testimony as to habits, conduct
and actions of cattle under certain circumstances by witnesses having
knowledge of cattle and their habits was admissible.
This rule appears to have been reaffirmed in State v. Grinsley,4 again
involving larceny of calves. Complainant testified that he saw two of
his cows wandering near defendant's corral containing a number of
calves. Complainant gained defendant's permission to bring the cows to
the corral to see if they would claim their calves, but before the test
could be made, defendant shot the calves. In determining that the ad-
mission of the testimony did not constitute prejudicial error, the Court
1See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 177 (3d ed. 1940); 94 A.L.R. 413 (1935); 18 A.L.R.3d
1221 (1968).
244 Mont. 311, 120 P. 225.
'Id. 120 P. at 227.
'96 Mont. 327, 30 P.2d 85 (1934).
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stated: "The evidence might have had some bearing on the test pro-
posed to determine whether or not the cows would claim the calves
found in defendant's possession. . .. "5 Impliedly the Court seemed willing
to accept the test proposed by complainant to establish ownership of the
calves; that is, the Court apparently would have accepted testimony of
the actions of the cows in selecting their calves.
These two cases indicate that the Court considered testimony of
cattle behavior admissible as a type of opinion evidence given by an
expert in the field. The Foley court expressly defined the expert as one
having knowledge of cattle.6 In both Foley and Grimsley, the witnesses
were apparently ranchers who had gained their knowledge by raising
or working with cattle.
From 1911 to 1951 the admissibility of actions of cattle as inter-
preted by one experienced in cattle behavior was an established rule
of evidence in Montana. In 1951, however, the case of State v. Storm'
struck a resounding blow to this rule and the resulting chaos has not
yet settled in peaceful resolution. WYithout reservation, the Storm court
refused to allow bloodhound testimony.
Storm was convicted of murder in the first degree. To place him
at the scene of the crime, the State was allowed, over defendant's
repeated objections, to introduce testimony concerning the actions of two
bloodhounds. The dogs allegedly had picked up the scent of the
murderer at the scene of the crime and traced it to defendant. During
the tracking their trainer had pulled them off their course for a dis-
tance of 100 feet, from which the dogs then continued until they
reached defendant. In ruling the testimony inadmissible, the Court gave
the following reasons: (1) "Dogs and other dumb animals do not qual-
ify as witnesses in the courts of this state. They know not the nature
of the oath. They may not be sworn. They cannot be cross-examined.
They testify only through professed interpreters whose translations
and conclusions are always hearsay." (2) Even those jurisdictions that
allowed bloodhound testimony did not allow such evidence when the
dogs had been dragged off the initial scent by their handler.9 (3) There
is no guarantee of reliability in this type of evidence since the dog is
capable of error. The defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be
jeopardized by the fallibility of a dog. 10 (4) The danger exists of jurors
placing too much weight on evidence of canine detection due to a super-
5Id. 30 P.2d at 88.
6Supra note 2, 120 P. at 227; see Miller v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 123, 80 P.321 (1905).
7125 Mont. 346, 238 P.2d 1161; subject of a Case Comment in 9 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
248 (1952).
'Id. 238 P.2d at 1176.
old.
0Id. 238 P.2d at 1179 citing Rex v. White, 37 B.C. 43, 3 D.L.R. 1 (1926) and at 1181
citing State v. Grba, 196 Iowa 241, 194 N.W. 250 (1923).
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stitious awe held by most people of the actions of animals.1 ' However,
the Court concluded by stating that "irrespective of the rule obtaining
elsewhere, we here hold that in this jurisdiction such so-called 'blood-
hound testimony' is incompetent and inadmissible. '12
The "rule obtaining elsewhere," at the time of the Storm decision
as well as now, allows bloodhound testimony if a proper foundation has
been laid.' 3 This foundation usually consists of the pedigree and train-
ing of the dog.' 4 The qualifications and experience of the trainer who
is the usual witness to testify and interpret the dog's actions,' 5 the
dog's prior experience and success in tracking, 16 and whether the scene
of the crime where the scent is first picked up is protected from intru-
sion.17 If the foundation is properly laid and the testimony admitted,
the evidence is circumstantial; it alone cannot support a conviction.' 8
Other jurisdictions remain opposed to bloodhound testimony because
of the reasons put forth by the majority of the Storm court;' 9 however,
11Id. 238 P.2d at 1179 citing McWhorter, The Bloodhound as a Witness, 54 Am. LAW
REv. 109 (1920).
'-Id. 238 P.2d at 1181-1182.
"3Alabama-Burks v. State, 240 Ala. 587, 200 So. 418 (1941); Aaron v. State, 271
Ala. 70, 122 So.2d 360 (1960).
Arkansas-Padgett v. State, 125 Ark. 471, 188 S.W. 1158 (1916); Rolen v.
State, 191 Ark. 1120, 89 S.W.2d 614 (1936).
Florida-Tomlinson v. State, 129 Fla. 658, 176 So. 543 (1937).
Georgia-Schell v. State, 72 Ga.App. 804, 35 S.E.2d 325 (1945); Mitchell v.
State, 202 Ga. 247, 42 S.E.2d 767 (1947).
Kansas-State v. Netherton, 133 Kan. 685, 3 P.2d 495 (1931).
Kentucky-Pedigo v. Comonwealth, 103 Ky. 41, 44 S.W. 143, 42 L.R.A. 432
(1898); Bullock v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 1, 60 S.W.2d 108, 94 A.L.R. 407 (1933);
Daugherty v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 147, 168 S.W.2d 564 (1943).
Louisiana-State v. Greene, 210 La. 157, 26 So.2d 487 (1946).
Massachusetts-Commonwealth v. Smith, 342 Mass. 180, 172 N.E.2d 597 (1961);
Commonwealth v. LePage, .- Mass. ....., 226 N.E.2d 200 (1967).
Mississippi-Hinton v. State, 175 Miss. 308, 166 So. 762 (1936).
Missouri-State v. Long,,336 Mo. 630, 80 S.W.2d 154 (1935).
North Carolina-State v. Dorsett, 245 N.C. 47, 95 S.E.2d 90 (1956); State
v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 139 S.E.2d 661 (1965).
Ohio-State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 969 (1907).
Oklahoma-Buck v. State, 77 Okl.Cr. 17, 138 P.2d 115 (1943).
Pennsylvania-Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 52 Pa.Super. 272 (1912).
South Carolina-State v. Brown, 103 S.C. 437, 88 S.E. 21 (1916).
Tennessee-Copley v. State, 153 Tenn. 189, 281 S.W. 460 (1926).
Texas-Parker v. State, 46 Tex.Cr. 461, 80 S.W. 1008 (1904).
West Virginia-State v. McKinney, 88 W.Va. 400, 106 S.E. 894 (1921).
"Short v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 604, 165 S.W.2d 177 (1942); State v. McLeod, 196
N.C. 542, 146 S.E. 409 (1929); Copley v. State, 153 Tenn. 189, 281 S.W. 460 (1926).
See also cases in note 13, supra.
"5State v. Barnes, 289 S.W. 562 (Mo. 1926); State v. King, 144 La. 430, 80 So. 615
(1919); Harris v. State, 143 Miss. 102, 108 So. 446 (1926); State v. Evans, 115 Kan.
538, 224 P. 492 (1924).
16State v. Harrison, 149 La. 83, 88 So. 696 (1921); State v. Yearwood, 178 N.C. 813,
101 S.E. 513 (1919) ; State v. Rowland, N.C., supra note 13.
"7Bullock v. Commonwealth, Kentucky, supra note 13; State v. Davis, 154 La. 295, 97
So. 449 (1923); Meyers v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 523, 240 S.W. 71 (1922).
"State v. Fixley, 118 Kan. 1, 233 P. 796 (1925); Daugherty v. Commonwealth, Ken-
tucky, supra note 13; State v. Storm, supra note 7, at 1185.
"People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411, 104 N.E. 804 (1914); Brott v. State, 70 Neb.
395, 97 N.E. 593, 63 L.R.A. 789 (1903); State v. Grba, supra note 10. Cf. People v.
Callahan, 324 Ill. 101, 154 N.E. 463 (1926).
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as the Court also noted, it is doubtful that the evidence presented in
Storm would have been admitted in a jurisdiction where bloodhound
testimony generally is allowed, since the dogs were dragged off their
initial scent at one point during the tracking.
20
Justice Angstman, in a lengthy dissent, refuted the majority's argu-
ments by insisting that the testimony had adequate safeguards since the
site where the initial scent was picked up had been sufficiently guarded
to insure the dogs were tracking no one but the suspected murderer,
21
and the dogs could not be considered as witnesses. The witness, accord-
ing to Angstman, is the trainer and the defendant had the opportunity
to cross-examine him.2-" He analogized the actions of the dogs to those
of ewe sheep being able to pick out their offspring from a flock con-
taining a hundred almost identical lambs.23 As authority for this pro-
position, he cited Grimsley. This is the only reference made in the
entire Storm decision to any type of animal behavior evidence other than
the actions of dogs. No mention was made of the Foley decision.
Several perplexing questions could have been asked following the
Storm decision. Did Storm overrule the admissibility of animal behavior
evidence in the Foley and Grimsley decision? Could the Storm holding
be narrowly construed to apply only to bloodhound testimony, thus
leaving the admissibility of cattle behavior evidence alive and well?
There was no reference in Storm to the admission of cattle behavior
evidence that had been an established rule in Montana for forty years.
It seems doubtful that the Court's holding could be construed to apply
solely to bloodhound testimony when it specifically referred to "dogs
and other dumb animals" as incompetent witnesses.24 By this language
it appears that the Court ruled all animal behavior evidence inadmissible.
The dissent may have been fighting for the survival of the cattle evi-
dence rule as well as the admission of the bloodhound testimony by
equating the actions of dogs and sheep. Although not expressly stated,
the dissent contended that all animal behavior evidence is admissible if
the witness is properly qualified to interpret the behavior. If a Montana
lawyer had followed this labyrinth of decisions, concluded that Storm
terminated the admissibility of all animal behavior evidence in Montana,
and rested on this supposition, the Perkins case2 5 in 1969 could only
have renewed his confusion.
Perkins was convicted of grand larceny of eleven calves. The
complainant, Williamson, in checking his cattle after a snowstorm,
noticed a number of cows bawling for their calves; their full udders indi-
cated they had not been nursed recently. Tire tracks in the snow placed
2Supra note 9.
2'Supra note 7 at 1182.1id. at 1186.
Id.
"Supra note 8.
'State v. Perkins, .Mont ....., 457 P.2d 465 (1969).
[Vol. 31
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suspicion on the defendant. Perkins granted Williamson permission to
bring the cows whose calves were missing to his corral which contained
75 or 80 calves. At the trial, the court allowed testimony as to the
actions of these eleven cows and calves when the cows were released
in defendant's corral. Each cow singled out a calf as her own. Then
the eleven pairs were separated, tagged and again released. The calves
returned to the same cows they had previously paired with and began
nursing. This "motherin g up" proved Williamson's ownership of the
calves.26 Perkins' counsel failed to object to any of the "mothering up"
testimony ;27 thus, when considered by the Montana Supreme Court,
the admissibility of this evidence was not in issue. The Court, however,
in upholding the conviction, relied heavily on the "mothering up" of
the cattle as an indication of defendant's guilt.
III. CONCLUSION
One could only conclude after the Perkins decision that the ap-
proach to animal behavior evidence by the Montana Court had come
full circle. To determine the present rule with legal precision would
require divine intervention. One could only attempt to second-guess the
intentions of the Court.
Did Perkins overrule Storm? The Perkins court did not expressly
refer to the admissibility of the "mothering up" evidence since the point
was not in issue. The Court was determining whether the evidence
supported the conviction and in affirming it, the Court considered the
"mothering up" as one of the strong points of the State's case. Without
this evidence it is doubtful that the conviction could have been upheld.
This reliance on animal behavior evidence tacitly implies that either
Storm is overruled or that the Court will not allow animal behavior
evidence only when it is bloodhound testimony.
Do two rules on animal behavior evidence exist? If parallel rules
exist, evidence concerning the actions of cattle is admissible 28 while
evidence concerning canine actions is not. The majority in Storm did
not refer to either Foley or Grimsley, so perhaps unconsciously the
Court was differentiating according to the specie of animal involved.
In the dissent, however. Justice Angstman refused to distinguish animal
behavior on this basis. 29 To support the concept of parallel rules, it
would be necessary to develop the cattle rule from Foley to Grimsley to
Perkins and regard Storm in a separate line of development for the canine
species only. This may be putting too narrow a construction on the
Storm decision.
2I1. at 468-469.
'State v. Perkins, Official Trial Transcript, Case No. 824.
O'See State v. McAteer, 227 Iowa 320, 288 N.W. 72 (1939).
'Supra note 22.
1970]
5
Muckelston: Animal Behavior Evidence
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1969
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Has the Montana Court been distinguishing quite covertly be-
tween learned behavior and instinctive behavior? In a recent Maryland
decision which admitted testimony of the actions of a German Shepherd
used by the police in tracking robbery suspects, the Court expressly
stated that the ability of a dog to track a human scent was not an in-
herent characteristic but one instilled through training.30 It is apparent
that some regard the ability of a dog to track as instinctive behavior
as evidenced by Angstman's view and courts which take judicial notice
of certain breeds as having an inherent ability to track.3' Nevertheless,
the majority in Storm may have made this differentiation when it
questioned the ability of bloodhounds to trace the guilty party without
error. According to the Court, dogs are fallible;32 the unexpressed
reasoning behind this view may be that learned behavior is more sus-
ceptible to mistakes than instinctive behavior.
The Court could have accepted without comment a theory that a
female animal has an instinctive ability to identify her young. This
instinctive behavior may appear to be so much stronger than any
learned behavior that fewer mistakes are likely to be made, thus guaran-
teeing more trustworthiness in this type of evidence. One witness in
the Perkins trial, a rancher for fifteen years, related that a range cow,
when confronted with a calf other than her own, will reject the calf
by kicking and butting it.33 From the type of cattle evidence given in
the three Montana decisions, "mothering up" seems to be an accepted
range test of identifying calves and the Court has tacitly adopted it.
Whatever be the Court's intent, canine evidence would not be ad-
missible under any of the suggested, developed rules of evidence in
Montana. When the probable number of cattle cases that may arise in
a cattle-industry state like Montana are weighed against the probable
number of cases involving tracking-dog evidence that may arise, the
Storm ruling may be of no consequence in the devolping rules of crim-
inal evidence. But this would ignore the increasing use of dogs in the
area of drug discovery, particularly to detect marijuana. The Montana
Court may be faced with the dilemma raised by Storm in the near future
when the choice will lie among affirming the rule set down in Storm
and refusing to admit testimony on canine detection, distinguishing
Storm on its facts, or simply overruling that decision.
SANDRA MUCKELSTON
Terrell v. State, 3 Md.App. 340, 239 A.2d 128 (1968) (contains a comprehensive sur-
vey of decisions concerning bloodhound testimony); see also WIGMORE, supra note 1.
3"Copley v. State, supra note 14.
a"Supra note 10.
mSupra note 27 at 83.
[Vol. 31
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 31 [1969], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/6
